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Abstract 
This paper investigates the influences of intrafirm geographic and cultural dispersion, the 
distance between the location of a firm’s investments and its headquarters, on the firm’s 
information environment. Specifically, using a sample of publicly traded real estate companies 
across the Asia-Pacific region, we examine how intrafirm geographic and cultural distance 
impacts a firm’s capital acquisition costs. As a consequence of both the heavily regulated 
operating environment faced by these firms, as well as the capital intensive nature of this 
industry, funding costs should be of pronounced importance to firms within this sector. 
Consistent with this paradigm, we find that firms with geographically disperse investments 
exhibit enhanced informational opacity. Specifically, firms with more geographically disperse 
investments exhibit higher capital acquisition costs than their more geographically 
concentrated counterparts. Similarly, firms with more culturally disparate investments also 
exhibit enhanced informational opacity, as evidenced by increased capital costs. Additionally, 
we present evidence that the impact of both physical and cultural distance is increasing 
following the global financial crisis. Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that 
both intrafirm geographic and cultural dispersion materially impact both an organization’s 
information environment and funding costs. 
Keywords 
Transparency; Cost of capital; Geography; Cultural distance  
Introduction 
Finance has long recognized the importance of information acquisition and processing to the 
efficient pricing of securities, with market participants tending to reward informationally 
transparent firms with a lower cost of capital than their more opaque counterparts. The opacity 
of firms is generally viewed as being jointly determined by the firm’s operations, investment 
activities, and disclosures. Firms adopting more transparent corporate structures, those 
investing in more easily identifiable and/or stable assets, and those providing enhanced 
disclosures are generally viewed as more informationally transparent.1 Interestingly, and of 
central import to the current investigation, recent studies suggest that a firm’s informational 
transparency may also be related to the “distance” between the firm and its investors. As 
outlined in more detail below, this emerging literature finds investor holdings in “local” 
companies tend to outperform holdings in companies that are more geographically distant. In 
general, these gains are attributed to “local” investors’ abilities to more efficiently overcome 
information barriers, either through enhanced access to soft information or through reduced 
monitoring costs. 
Additionally, the literature has also begun to recognize the impact culture exerts on market 
development and firm operations. Of note, Hofstede (1980) defines culture as “the collective 
mental programming of the human mind which distinguishes one group of people from 
another.”2 More specifically, culture exerts an impact on business beyond the legal and 
regulatory systems by defining perceptions and acceptable actions. Thus, culture serves to 
establish the “rules of the game” that market participants must follow. Moreover, evidence of 
the impact of cultural distance, the differences between the cultures of two areas, on the 
performance of cross-border operations is accumulating.3  
While the existing literature focuses on the physical and cultural distance between market 
participants (i.e., a firm’s proximity to either its investors or other firms), we focus on the 
geographic dispersion and cultural distance within a firm. More specifically, we examine how 
intrafirm physical proximity and cultural similarity (i.e., the distance between a firm’s 
headquarters and its investments) influences the firm’s informational opacity. Previewing our 
results, we find evidence that as the physical and cultural distance within a firm increases the 
organization becomes more informationally opaque. In particular, firms characterized by larger 
geographic footprints and/or more cultural heterogeneity within the organization exhibit higher 
implied costs of capital than firms with smaller physical footprints and/or less cultural diversity. 
Moreover, we find the relations between both physical and cultural distance with the firm’s cost 
of capital are magnified following the 2007 global financial crisis. Thus, we conclude these 
constructs represent value relevant components of a firm’s information environment which 
must be proactively and strategically managed to ensure the welfare maximization of 
shareholders. 
The remainder of this investigation is organized in the following manner. Section two reviews 
the existing literature on the importance of geography in financial markets, motivates the use of 
publicly traded Asia-Pacific real estate firms as a uniquely compelling natural laboratory in 
which to examine the relations between intrafirm physical and cultural distance and information 
opacity, and outlines the rationale for employing a firm’s cost of capital to examine these 
issues. Section three outlines the data and empirical methods employed throughout this 
investigation to examine our focal hypotheses, while section four provides the results of this 




Economists have long recognized the potential benefits offered by international diversification, 
as well as the potential costs associated with home bias issues.4 Only recently, however, has 
the literature begun to recognize the potential advantages associated with geographic 
proximity. The origins of this emerging location literature can be traced to Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999, 2001), who document significantly positive, risk-adjusted returns accruing to investors’ 
“local” company investments.5 Such out-performance suggests investors possess a distinct, 
competitive advantage in valuing “local” firms. One potential explanation for the local investor 
advantage derives from the nature of the information generation, collection, and transmission 
process. Specifically, a number of papers offer evidence consistent with the notion that market 
participants who are physically closer to a firm are uniquely positioned to access and capture 
valuable soft information regarding these “local” entities. For example, both Malloy (2005); Bae 
et al. (2008) find local analysts systematically provide better recommendations and more 
accurate forecasts than their more geographically distant counterparts. Similarly, Berry and 
Gamble (2013) argue local retail investors possess informational advantages, as they find 
security returns following earnings announcements are predicted by the trading patterns of 
local market investors, while Ghoul et al. (2013) explicitly use geographic distance as a proxy 
for information asymmetry.6 Within a real estate context, Ling et al. (2016) examine the role of 
geography in explaining performance differentials across public and private real estate markets 
within the United States, while Adams et al. (2015) provide evidence on the potential 
importance of geographic proximity to a firm’s risk management activities. Importantly, this 
latter paper demonstrates geographic proximity is fundamentally related to potential risk spill-
over effects, and further suggests such effects are magnified during periods of economic 
stress and uncertainty. Taken together, the above results strongly suggest geographic 
proximity plays an important role in the informational transparency of publicly traded (real 
estate) companies.7  
The importance of geographic proximity between market participants is becoming increasingly 
apparent to both academic researchers and industry practitioners. We note that, within 
international real estate markets, the vast majority of real estate firms acquiring investment 
properties outside of their home country (i.e., where the firm is headquartered), retain local 
expertise in the form of independent, third-party advisors, appraisers, and/or investment 
managers to facilitate the acquisition, development, continuing operation, and/or divestiture of 
individual properties. Moreover, an Asia Pacific Real Estate Association (APREA) (2014) 
survey of nearly 200 institutional real estate investors and fund managers finds that while less 
than half believe it is important for a real estate firm’s management to be located in the country 
where its shares are traded, over 84% reported firm management should be located in its area 
of operations. Based upon this survey evidence, institutional real estate market participants 
appear to clearly believe a local market presence is important to efficient portfolio allocation 
and management decision-making. 
Cultural Distance 
The role of culture is also receiving increased attention within the finance literature. For 
example, Guiso et al. (2006, 2009) find evidence that culture influences a nation’s economic 
performance, as well as economic exchanges between countries. Similarly, Aggarwal and 
Goodell (2009a, b, 2010) find evidence that culture influences how a nation’s financial system 
develops, while Zheng et al. (2012) find evidence that national culture helps to explain cross-
country variation in corporate debt maturity structure. Finally, from an investments perspective, 
Chui et al. (2010) find that national culture influences the performance of momentum 
strategies. These findings are not entirely unexpected given that culture manifests itself in how 
people interact and make decisions, which in turn likely influences how firms operate along a 
variety of key dimensions.8 For example, does the society readily embrace entrepreneurial risk 
taking or does it tend towards risk aversion? Does a short-term or long-term investment 
horizon drive decision making? How equally is power distributed across members of the group, 
and does the group accept and tolerate inequality or proactively work to limit, or eliminate, 
disparities across its members? Is gender equality prioritized, or does a masculine (feminine) 
world view predominate? Are personal and corporate goals, initiatives, and investment 
priorities driven by a pursuit of individualistic goals, or collectivistic aspirations? 
In addition to presenting evidence regarding the impact of culture, the literature also presents 
evidence that investors are more confident evaluating firms, assets, or investment projects in 
countries that are culturally similar to the investors’ own home country.9 For example, Hofstede 
(1980); Jemison and Sitkin (1986); Morosini et al. (1998) all provide evidence that cultural 
distance, a measure of how dissimilar two cultures are, influences the performance of cross-
border acquisitions. Furthermore, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) find that cultural distance 
between markets influences the amount of foreign investment, while Anderson et al. (2011) 
similarly report institutionally managed funds invest less in culturally distant countries. 
Moreover, Beracha et al. (2014) find that institutional investors trade less frequently in 
culturally distant countries, while Nahata et al. (2014) demonstrate that when the cultural 
distance between venture capitalist and portfolio firms is greater the likelihood of success 
increases. Continuing, Anita et al. (2007) observe that when the cultural distance between a 
multinational firm’s headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries increases firm valuation 
decreases. Along these same dimensions, Steigner and Sutton (2011) examine the 
performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and find that when bidding firms have 
high levels of intangible assets, their long run performance is positively associated with the 
cultural distance between their home country and that of the target. Lastly, Cai and Zhu (2015) 
examine the underpricing of initial public offerings issued by foreign firms within the United 
States and find that the degree of underpricing is a function of the cultural distance between 
the US and the firm’s country of origin. More explicitly, they find that the greater the cultural 
distance, the greater the degree of underpricing. Taken together, these results suggest cultural 
distance directly influences both information asymmetry and financial opacity. 
While the extant literature presents evidence regarding the impact of the physical and cultural 
distance between market participants, we explore the impact of physical and cultural distance 
within the firm. Specifically, we explore how the physical and cultural distance between a firm’s 
headquarters and the location of its cash flow generating assets influences its financial market 
transparency. Ex-ante, we expect that as intrafirm physical and cultural distance increases the 
firm will become more informationally opaque. In other words, we expect company outsiders 
(e.g., investors, analysts, regulators, etc.) will find the firm harder to value/understand when it 
is spread over a larger physical area, or has properties located in countries which are more 
culturally dissimilar. Further, the resulting valuation difficulty should manifest itself in the form 
of tangible, value relevant economic consequences. As such, the current investigation 
explores the impact of both geographic and cultural distance on financial market opacity by 
examining each firm’s implied cost-of-capital.10  
Why Asia-Pacific Real Estate Firms? 
To effectively identify and isolate the relations between intrafirm geographic and cultural 
distance and a firm’s opacity, it is critically important to control for as many potential sources of 
extraneous variation as possible. As informational transparency is likely to differ markedly 
across industries and market sectors, to assist in this process we restrict our analysis to a 
single industry. Additionally, an ideal sample would focus on a subset of firms for which 
informational transparency issues may be uniquely important. Therefore, we focus exclusively 
on publicly traded real estate companies (e.g., REITs, listed property trusts, and developers) 
across the Asia-Pacific region. Focusing on this specific industry provides a number of 
compelling advantages. First, unlike industries with high levels of investment in intangible 
assets, research and development expenditures, and/or intellectual property rights, real estate 
firms generally hold portfolios of easily identifiable, tangible assets.11 Furthermore, as space 
markets continue to be highly localized, the cashflows accruing to these assets are largely a 
function of the economic conditions prevailing in the local market area in which each individual 
asset is physically located.12 Both of these factors help us more effectively identify the true 
geographic and cultural exposure faced by each sample firm. 
Second, the unique regulatory environment in which these firms operate further motivates the 
use of this industry as a laboratory for the current investigation. Real estate firms around the 
world are typically viewed as being capital constrained. Firms choosing to pursue REIT status 
typically face high regulatory mandated payout ratios which effectively prohibit them from 
retaining large enough sums of capital to endogenously fund capital expansion activities. Even 
for those firms not facing mandatory payout requirements, the large scale of many commercial 
real estate investment activities necessitates active and continuing engagement with broader 
financial markets. As documented by Amihud and Mendelsohn (1986, 2000), financial market 
transparency has been shown to influence a firm’s cost of capital, and thus, real estate firms 
with a frequent need to access external capital markets are likely to place a high value on both 
financial market transparency and the resultant reduction in their cost of capital. 
Third, while each of the aforementioned advantages suggests commercial real estate markets 
are a good laboratory for our examination, Asia-Pacific real estate markets offer one final 
advantage over their U.S. and European counterparts – high levels of cross-border investment. 
While U.S. based real estate companies typically hold relatively few, if any, properties outside 
of the United States, Asia-Pacific real estate firms exhibit a significant proclivity toward 
investing across international borders. To illustrate this point, we note that firms within our 
sample disclosed investment property holdings across 47 different countries. A more complete 
description of our sample is provided in the Data and Methodology section, while a 
comprehensive listing of the geographic locations for all 9876 investment properties held by 
sample firms is provided in Appendix 1. 
Cost of Capital Considerations 
The extant literature demonstrates that both corporate and managerial policies, practices, and 
procedures which increase a firm’s informational opacity also effectively serve to increase its 
cost of capital. For example, Anglin et al. (2011) suggest that as information asymmetries 
between investors and managers increase, so too does the firm’s cost of capital. Similarly, 
Danielsen et al. (2009, 2014) demonstrate that enhanced accounting disclosures reduce 
information barriers between firms and investors, engender positive certification effects 
regarding the company’s continuing operations, and thereby lead to reductions in the 
organization’s capital acquisition costs. Perhaps most closely related to the current 
investigation, Cashman et al. (2015) examine REITs and listed property trusts across the Asia-
Pacific region and find evidence that increased exposure to political risk increases both a firm’s 
cost of raising external equity and its weighted average cost of capital. While these studies 
provide support for the conceptual framework we utilize, namely, that increasing informational 
opacity increases a firm’s cost of capital, to the best of our knowledge the existing literature 
has not yet explored the impact of either intrafirm geographic or cultural distance on firm 
opacity. 
Data and Methodology 
Data 
In assembling our sample, we begin by identifying all Asia-Pacific real estate companies (e.g., 
REITs, listed property trusts, real estate operating companies, and development firms) 
followed by SNL Financial that trade on the Australian Stock Exchange, Bombay Stock 
Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, or Tokyo Stock Exchange at 
any point from January 2000 to December 2013.13 We then match each SNL firm to 
Bloomberg, which provides daily stock prices. We use firm ticker symbol, institution name, and 
stock exchange to match observations between the two databases. Firms for which we are 
unable to obtain matching Bloomberg data are removed from the sample. This results in a 
sample of 160 real estate firms, headquartered in six distinct countries, investing in 9876 
properties, which are spread across 47 countries. Table 1 provides a breakdown of both the 
countries where sample firms are headquartered and where their investment properties are 
physically located, while Appendix 2 provides a comprehensive listing of all sample firms by 
the country in which they are headquartered. We note that while nearly 60% of our sample real 
estate firms are headquartered in Hong Kong or Singapore, less than 20% of the properties in 
our sample are located within these same two jurisdictions. Additionally, we note that a robust 
17.6% of the investment properties held by sample firms are located in countries outside of the 
six nations in which our sample firms are headquartered. These two facts clearly reflect the 
willingness and ability of many Asia-Pacific real estate firms to engage in cross-border 
investment activities. On the other hand, somewhat less obvious from these raw numbers is 
the inter-country variation in foreign investment proclivity. While considerably more than half of 
all sample firms headquartered in Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore invest internationally, 
only 7 of the 42 sample firms headquartered in China, India, and Japan engage in international 
investments. This country level variation motivates our use of country level fixed effects 
throughout the empirical analysis which follows. 
Table 1 Geographic distribution of sample companies and properties 
Headquarter 
country 

















Australia 23 14.38% 1941 19.65% 19.50% 62.03% 
China 7 4.38% 1503 15.22% 0% 0% 
Hong Kong 48 30.00% 1161 11.76% 43.91% 77.75% 
India 8 5.00% 162 1.64% 0% 0% 
Japan 27 16.88% 2573 26.05% 1.37% 25.31% 
Singapore 47 29.38% 799 8.09% 52.05% 84.41% 
Other 0 0.00% 1737 17.59%     
Total 160 100% 9876 100%     
This table provides a breakdown of the headquarter locations of the real estate firms in our sample, as 
well as the geographic location distribution of all properties owned by sample firms 
Estimating the Cost of Capital 
In examining the market’s reaction to a firm’s decisions regarding the physical footprint and 
cultural diversity of its investment property portfolio, we employ each firm’s cost of debt, cost of 
equity, and weighted average cost of capital as our key dependent variables of interest. Each 
firm’s cost of debt is estimated simply as its annual total interest expenses divided by its total 
debt.14 Turning to equity acquisition costs, we follow the prior literature and estimate each 
firm’s cost of equity via a residual income valuation model.15 Conceptually, the value of a firm 
at any point in time should be approximately equal to its current book value plus the present 
value of any future abnormal earnings. Thus, algebraically: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,0 = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,0 + � 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1(1+𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒)𝑡𝑡∞𝑡𝑡=1  (1) 
where: 
P 0current stock price for firm i 
B i,0current book value of equity for firm i 
B i,t book value of equity for firm i at time t 
r i,e required rate of return on equity for firm i 
E i,t net income during period t for firm i. 
In operationalizing this model, Lee et al. (1999) find that the quality of their estimation of 
current firm values is insensitive to the choice of the forecast horizon beyond 3 years. Thus, in 
order to have a closed-form expression, we employ a three year forward looking window for 
future earnings to estimate each firm’s cost of equity. Furthermore, following the previous real 
estate literature, to mitigate problems associated with lack of analyst forecast estimates 
regarding future earnings, we assume perfect foresight and recursively solve Eq. (1) for the 
firm’s required rate of return on equity. Market data required to estimate this relation are 
obtained directly from Bloomberg, while the accounting data necessary to estimate component 
weights from a book value perspective are obtained from SNL Financial. Finally, to estimate 
each firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC), we sum the estimated costs of each 
capital component multiplied by their proportional weights, which are defined based upon each 
firm’s market leverage ratio. Hence, algebraically: 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)(1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (2) 
where: 
W Di,t               weight of debt in the capital structure of firm i at time t 
r Di,t                 cost of debt for firm i at time t 
T i,t              marginal tax rate of firm i at time t (equal to zero for most REITs) 
W ei,t           weight of equity in the capital structure of firm i at time t 




In order to calculate physical distance, we start by obtaining the geographic locations (i.e., 
addresses) of each firm’s headquarters, as well as every property in which the firm held an 
investment stake at any point in time over our sample period. We then map (i.e., geocode) 
these locations to obtain precise latitude and longitude coordinates for each observation. Next, 
using these coordinates we estimate the Haversine (great circle) distance between each firm’s 
headquarters location and each of its associated investment property holdings. Finally, we 
calculate the average geographic distance between the firm’s headquarters and its investment 
properties.16 Specifically, we use the following equation: 
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑚𝑚� {3963.1𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 × 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑−1[sin(𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝) × sin(𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑_𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + cos(𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝) ×𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝cos(𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑_𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) × cos(𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝 − 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴_𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) (3) 
where: 
m                  the total number of investment property interests held by firm i at month t 
lat_P i,t,p         the latitude of property p’s location for firm i at month t 
lat_H i,t           the latitude of the headquarters location of firm i at month t 
long_P i,t,p      the longitude of property p’s location for firm i at month t 
long_H i,t        the longitude of the headquarters location of firm i at month t. 
To the extent increasing the physical scope of a firm’s operations hinders the information 
generation, collection, processing, or dissemination capability of market participants, we would 
expect firms characterized by a wider geographic scope of operations (e.g., a larger average 
distance between their headquarters and investment property locations) to be more 
informationally opaque. As such, we anticipate our average distance metric to be positively 
related to a firm’s implied cost of capital. 
Cultural Distance Proxies 
We again note that the premise of our investigation is to evaluate the impact of intrafirm 
distance on the information environment surrounding the firm. Accordingly, we anticipate that 
as the cultural distance within a firm increases the firm will become more informationally 
opaque. While measuring physical distance is relatively straightforward, measuring culture 
distance is somewhat more difficult. To quantify the social characteristics that comprise 
culture, we turn to the field of social psychology. Early work by Hofstede (1980, 2001); Franke 
et al. (1991), as well as more recent investigations by House et al. (2004); Minkov (2007); 
Anderson et al. (2011), provide the benchmark indices we employ to investigate the impact of 
culture on a firm’s information environment. Specifically, we rely on two widely used metrics – 
Hofstede Scores and GLOBE Indices -- to measure culture and calculate intrafirm cultural 
distance. 
Hofstede scores are obtained from Geert Hofstede’s website (www.geert-hofstede.com/) and 
are designed to measure six distinct cultural dimensions. These factors include assessments 
of a society’s attitudes and responses with respect to issues of: 1) Power Distance, 2) 
Individualism versus Collectivism, 3) Masculinity versus Femininity, 4) Uncertainty Avoidance, 
5) Long Term versus Short Term Orientation, and 6) Indulgence versus Restraint. More 
detailed descriptions of each of these dimensions (as well as all sample variables) may be 
found in Appendix 3. Operationally, these six factors are combined to create two separate 
culture indices. First, following Kogut and Singh (1988) we exclude information regarding both 
a country’s Long Term Orientation and proclivity towards Indulgence and construct an average 
index of cultural distance using the original four dimensions of cultural identity (Hofstede 4 
Factor Index) proposed by Hofstede. Second, following the work of Franke et al. (1991); 
Minkov (2007), which together provide the conceptual foundations for extending Hofstede’s 
original four dimensions to its current six, we also construct an average index of cultural 
distance using all six Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede 6 Factor Index). For those countries in 
which Hofstede individual dimension scores are unavailable, we replace missing values with 
the average value across all nations for that specific year and month.17  
To ensure our empirical results are not driven by idiosyncratic factors specific to the 
construction of these Hofstede metrics, for robustness we also employ two cultural distance 
metrics derived from Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) 
Indices. These GLOBE scores were first introduced by House et al. (2004), and encompass 
the following nine dimensions of culture: 1) Performance Orientation, 2) Uncertainty 
Avoidance, 3) In-Group Collectivism, 4) Power Distance, 5) Gender Egalitarianism, 6) Humane 
Orientation, 7) Institutional Collectivism, 8) Future Orientation, and 9) Assertiveness. As with 
our Hofstede metrics, one of our GLOBE indices (Globe 9 Factor Index) employs the entire set 
of available factors, while our second index employs a more parsimonious subset. Specifically, 
following Anderson et al. (2011), we create a more restricted GLOBE index (Globe 4 Factor 
Index) which includes only the following four cultural dimensions: Future Orientation, 
Assertiveness, In-Group Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance. As with our Hofstede 
Indices, for countries in which GLOBE dimension scores are unavailable, we replace the 
missing values with the average value across all nations for that specific year and month.18  
Our cultural distance metric is a weighted average of the cultural distance between the firm 
headquarters nation’s cultural values and the cultural index values of those nations in which its 
investment properties are located. Specifically, for each firm-month we calculate the 
percentage (based on the number of properties) of each firm’s investment property portfolio 
holdings that are located within each country.19 We then multiply these country specific 
portfolio location weights by individual country cultural distance measures which are found by 
taking the absolute value of the difference between the index values for the country where a 
firm’s properties are located and the index value for the country where the firm’s headquarters 
is located. This procedure is repeated for each of the cultural indices examined. 
Mathematically: 
𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑 = � (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑)𝑐𝑐  (4) 
where: 
NIP i,t,c            the total number of investment property interests located in country c, held by firm i, at 
month t, 
TNIP i,t           the total number of investment property interests held by firm i, at month t, 
CD i,t,c,d          the level of cultural distance between firm i’s headquarter country and properties located 
in country c, at month t, along cultural difference dimension d. 
Control Variables 
Following Cashman et al. (2016), to provide a complete and robust econometric specification 
we also control for both the general business environment and firm specific characteristics. A 
comprehensive list of these controls, along with a detailed description of their construction 
and/or measurement, is provided in Appendix 3.20 In addition, we also control for each firm’s 
exposure to political risk. Cashman et al. (2014, 2016, 2015) all present evidence that the 
political risk associated with the location of a firm’s investments impacts its operations, 
organizational structure, and ability to raise capital. To account for this possibility, we utilize 
four measures previously employed in the existing literature to control for political risk.21 
Specifically, the four metrics we employ are: 1) a Disclosure Index, reported by the World 
Bank, designed to measure the quality and quantity of corporate disclosures with respect to 
ownership and financial information; 2) an Operations Risk Index (ORI), reported by Business 
Risk Services, designed to measure the business friendly nature of the overall political and 
regulatory environment; 3) a Remittance and Repatriation of Capital (R-Factor) Index, also 
reported by Business Risk Services, designed to measure the relative ease of capital flows 
across jurisdictional boundaries; and 4) a Political Risk Index (PRI), reported by Business Risk 
Service, designed to measure the sociopolitical conditions of a country. To facilitate readability 
and ease interpretation, each of these indices have been (re)scaled such that positive values 
indicate increased risk exposure along that particular dimension. Consistent with the existing 
literature, we use the geographic (country) location of every individual real estate property held 
by each firm in the sample to estimate (investment property location weighted average) 
measures of each firm’s exposure to political risk. Specifically, for each of our four political risk 
proxies we create firm specific political risk index values as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐  (5) 
where: 
NIP i,t,c          the total number of investment property interests located in country c, held by firm i, at 
month t, 
TNIP i , t      the total number of investment property interests held by firm i, at month t, and. 
Country Level refers to one of the four political risk indices outlined above:  
Risk Metric t,c   Disclosure, Operations Risk, R-Factor, and Political Risk. 
Furthermore, we control for a firm’s foreign investment experience. Specifically, we control for 
the firm’s entrance into a “new country” (i.e. its acquisition of a property in a country where the 
firm did not previously have an equity investment), the amount of time the firm has been 
engaged in cross border investing, an indicator variable identifying those firms whose 
headquarters location and exchange trading venue are in different countries, the percentage of 
the firm’s investment properties that are located in foreign countries, and an indicator variable 
identifying those firms who employ foreign denominated debt within their capital structure. 
Conceptually, the acquisition of a property in a “new” country may make the firm more 
informationally opaque. For example, it may well take a non-trivial investment of managerial 
time and/or other company resources to fully integrate these new and diverse investments into 
the company’s operational framework and risk management apparatus. Similarly, the market 
has to learn about the firm’s ability to operate within this new environment, including their 
ability to coordinate activities across a broader geographic footprint and manage the risks 
inherent in operating across additional political jurisdictions. Jointly, these effects may well 
increase uncertainty surrounding the vitality of the firm’s operations, and thus be associated 
with increased capital costs. 
Conversely, it is possible that as firms spend more time investing internationally, the market 
becomes more familiar with both the firm’s international activities and their ability to manage 
and mitigate potential risk exposure along this dimension. Therefore, as the duration of a firm’s 
international investment experience increases, we would expect both uncertainty surrounding 
the firm’s operations and the resulting cost of capital to decline. The decision to list in a country 
other than the nation in which the firm is headquartered adds an additional layer of complexity 
that the market must contend with. As such, ex-ante we anticipate such firms will be more 
informationally opaque, and therefore characterized by higher capital acquisition costs.22 
Moreover, as with the duration of a firm’s international experience, the portion of the firm’s 
investments located in foreign countries may proxy for international expertise which may 
mitigating risk exposure. Lastly, while the use of foreign denominated debt by a firm adds an 
additional layer of complexity to their operations, risk management function, and resulting 
valuations, these potential costs may well be offset by lower capital costs associated with 
accessing a broader potential investor base, more complete disclosures necessary to satisfy 
multiple regulatory authorities, risk reduction through matching the currency of expected 
revenues and liabilities, and/or positive signaling effects regarding the firm’s market power and 
position. 
Methodology 
Our empirical investigation proceeds in two stages. We first provide descriptive statistics and 
univariate comparisons designed to allow the reader to gain insight into the nature of both the 
firms in our sample and the Asia-Pacific real estate markets in which they operate, as well as 
their comparability to alternative real estate firms and markets around the world. We next 
proceed to the multivariate portion of our analysis where we examine the influence of intrafirm 
physical and cultural distance on a firm’s information environment, simultaneously controlling 
for a broad array of firm and market characteristics. As outlined above, if the physical scope of 
the firm’s property holdings and/or the cultural distance between its assets influences the firm’s 
information environment, the effects should manifest themselves in the form of higher cost of 
capital estimates. 
Throughout the multi-variate portion of our analysis, our cost of capital regressions employ the 
following general form23: 
𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2−5𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽6−9𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽10−18𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽19−37𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽38−42𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
 
(6) 
A significant, positive coefficient on 𝛽𝛽 1 in Eq. 6 would be consistent with a firm’s intrafirm 
physical distance creating information barriers, lowering the financial market transparency of 
the firm, and thereby raising the firm’s cost of capital. Similarly, a significant positive coefficient 
on 𝛽𝛽 2 in Eq. 6 would be consistent with intrafirm cultural distance contributing to increased 




Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each variable employed throughout our analysis. The 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for sample firms averaged 8.7% across our sample 
period, with the component costs of debt and equity estimated at 2.9% and 13.6%, 
respectively.24 Each estimate appears to be economically reasonable, and very much in line 
with ex-ante expectations. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
  N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Cost of capital metrics 
 Weighted average cost of capital 14,497 0.087 0.076 0.055 0.013 0.330 
 Cost of debt (rd) 14,497 0.029 0.022 0.025 0.000 0.172 
 Cost of equity (re) 14,497 0.136 0.108 0.096 0.023 0.422 
Distance metrics 
 Geographic distance 
  Physical distance (in 
1000 miles) 
14,497 0.985 0.439 1.363 0.000 6.781 
  N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
 Cultural distance indices 
  Hofstede 4 factor index 14,497 0.373 0.074 0.794 0.000 5.288 
  Hofstede 6 factor index 14,497 0.356 0.094 0.644 0.000 3.590 
  GLOBE 4 Factor Index 14,497 1.036 0.300 1.449 0.000 5.932 
  GLOBE 9 Factor Index 14,497 1.100 0.346 1.471 0.000 7.331 
Control variables 
 Political risk metrics 
  Disclosure 14,497 0.815 0.808 0.107 0.500 1.000 
  ORI 14,497 0.618 0.634 0.069 0.380 0.757 
  R-Factor 14,497 0.700 0.728 0.161 0.385 0.970 
  PRI 14,497 0.557 0.560 0.116 0.350 0.760 
 Business environment measures 
  UK Law 14,497 0.727 0.917 0.345 0.000 1.000 
  Bank dominated 14,497 0.186 0.000 0.389 0.000 1.000 
  GAAP 14,497 0.303 0.000 0.460 0.000 1.000 
  Time to export 14,497 11.936 10.901 4.854 6.000 27.000 
  Property acquisition 
complexity 
14,497 25.169 28.000 14.519 4.033 94.985 
  Market cap / GDP 14,497 171.032 121.335 132.969 19.356 606.004 
  Broadband per 100 14,497 18.697 21.747 9.211 0.021 37.516 
  Education Spending 14,497 14.024 13.471 5.390 6.051 25.014 
  Female labor force 
participation 
14,497 54.549 55.617 7.520 26.900 69.000 
 General firm characteristics 
  Market cap ($Millions) 14,497 3469.680 1162.460 5765.060 6.998 52,644.310 
  MtoB 14,497 1.158 0.940 0.995 0.120 8.552 
  Leverage 14,497 0.689 0.539 0.619 0.000 4.235 
  Asset tangibility 14,497 0.537 0.542 0.054 0.079 0.753 
  Total assets (in $1000s) 14,497 5,527,630 2,009,384 8,776,906 206 66,174,868 
  Profitability 14,497 0.057 0.055 0.065 −0.675 0.488 
  Secured debt 14,497 49.308 46.419 41.404 0.000 100.000 
  Rate debt 14,497 0.418 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
  Split rating 14,497 0.050 0.000 0.218 0.000 1.000 
  Asset age 14,497 5.960 6.000 3.253 1.000 13.000 
  Repurchases 14,497 0.028 0.000 0.165 0.000 1.000 
  Operating leverage 14,497 1.713 1.217 3.096 −4.078 10.739 
  Lease payments 14,497 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.034 
  N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
  # of countries 14,497 3.010 2.000 3.260 1.000 18.000 
  Development 14,497 0.584 1.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
  REIT Status 14,497 0.365 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
  # of Properties 14,497 50.152 31.000 51.488 1.000 317.000 
  Single country 14,497 0.445 0.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 
  Home indicator 14,497 0.318 0.000 0.466 0.000 1.000 
 Foreign experience 
  Entrance 14,497 0.001 0.000 0.033 0.000 1.000 
  Foreign tenure 14,497 96.147 90.000 65.057 0.000 787.000 
  Headquarter ≠ Exchange 14,497 0.052 0.000 0.222 0.000 1.000 
  Foreign properties/Total 
properties 
14,497 0.339 0.158 0.372 0.000 1.000 
  Foreign debt indicator 14,497 0.374 0.000 0.484 0.000 1.000 
This table provides basic descriptive statistics (sample size, mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum) for the variables considered in the analysis. Appendix 3 provides a detailed 
description and definition of each variable 
Turning to our focal distance metrics, we find our sample of publicly traded Asia-Pacific real 
estate firms hold investments across a broad geographic area. The average distance between 
a company’s headquarters and its investment properties is nearly 1000 miles. Epitomizing the 
international nature of this industry, Federation Centres is headquartered in Australia, but has 
held shopping center interests across Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The 
average geographic distance between the company’s headquarters in Melbourne and its 
hundreds of investment properties was literally thousands of miles over much of our sample 
period.25  
With respect to cultural distance, the economic intuition is more complex. Each of our metrics 
are correlated (see Table 3 for specific correlations), with an underlying index based upon a 
100 point scale. In calculating these distances, as outlined above, we take the squared 
deviations and standardize them by the cross-national variance of the index.26 This provides a 
measure of how distinct the cultures of those nations in which the firm invests are from the 
national culture associated with the firm’s headquarters location. Operationally, we are 
relatively unconcerned with the absolute value of these indices, but rather are primarily 
concerned with the marginal impact of changes in these indices on the capital acquisition costs 
of the firm. Comfortingly, the data in Table 2 suggest considerable variation exists along each 
of these cultural distance metrics, thus providing a robust framework and set of benchmarks 
with which to investigate our focal relations. 
  
Table 3 Intrafirm physical and cultural distance correlation matrix 
Pearson correlation coefficients 
N = 14,497, Prob > |r| under H0: Rho = 0 
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0.6341 0.9722             




0.4357 0.6677 0.6821           




0.4359 0.6423 0.6646 0.9630         
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)         
Disclosure 
−0.1046 −0.0510 −0.0670 −0.2825 −0.2622       
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)       
ORI 
-0.0346 −0.0655 −0.0804 −0.3427 −0.3850 0.6356     
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)     
R-Factor 
−0.3441 0.0123 −0.0003 −0.0423 −0.0586 0.1926 0.2408   
(<.0001) (0.1403) (0.9725) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)   
PRI 
0.2260 0.1267 0.1101 −0.0002 0.0122 −0.0681 0.2393 −0.2051 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9797) (0.1415) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
This table reports the correlation coefficients associated with our various distance and political risk 
measures. The Hofstede 4 Factor Index is the property weighted average of cultural distance based on 
Hofstede’s: Power Distance Index, Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, 
and Uncertainty Avoidance Index. Hofstede 6 Factor Index is the property weighted average of cultural 
distance based on all six of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. GLOBE 4 Factor Index is the property 
weighted cultural distance measure based on GLOBE’s: Future Orientation, Assertiveness, In-Group 
Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance metrics. GLOBE 9 Factor Index is the property weighted 
average of culture distance based on all of GLOBE’s cultural dimensions. Physical Distance to 
Properties is the average geographic distance between a firm’s headquarters and its investment 
properties. Disclosure is the property weighted average of the Business Extent of Disclosure index. ORI 
is the property weighted average of the operations risk index measure. R-Factor measures the ease 
with which a firm can repatriate profits out of a given country. PRI is the property weighted average of 
the Political Risk Index and measures sociopolitical risk. More detailed definitions are provided in the 
Appendix 3  
Examining these exposure metrics more closely reveals interesting patterns in firm investment 
activity across time. For example, in Fig. 1 we note that during the early years of our analysis 
fewer than 35% of sample firms restricted their investment activities to a single country, while 
by the end of our sample period this number had risen to over 55%. This increased investment 
focus is further evidenced, in Fig. 2, by a noticeable reduction in the average number of 
investment property interests held by sample firms. More specifically, during the early years of 
our sample, firms held an average of over 60 properties in their investment portfolios. Over our 
sample interval, this number declined by more than 25%, dropping below 45 property holdings 
per firm by 2013. On the other hand, focusing exclusively on those firms which choose to 
invest abroad, we find evidence that they are increasing the size of their physical footprint and 
cultural heterogeneity. For example, in Fig. 3, while the average physical distance between 
firm headquarters and investment property locations increased modestly during our sample 
period, the average values for all four cultural distance metrics increased markedly. More 
specifically, both Hofstede metrics increased more than three-fold, while the average values 
for our two GLOBE exposure indices increased between 40% and 50%. While a formal 
analysis of these trends is beyond the scope of the current investigation, they are consistent 
with the notion that Asia-Pacific real estate markets have witnessed an important evolution in 
recent years. These changes entail both an increase in the aggregate level of international 
holdings and, simultaneously, an increasing concentration of those holdings within a smaller 
subset of firms who may well (or may not) be uniquely positioned to manage this exposure. 
 
Fig. 1 Percentage of firms investing in a single country each year 
 
Fig. 2 Average number of properties owned by a firm each year 
 
Fig. 3 Firms investing in multiple countries by distance 
Continuing, our dataset also includes a number of important control variables designed to 
ensure the accuracy, consistency, and robustness of our core results. We divide these controls 
into four groups: 1) Political Risk Metrics, 2) Business Environment Measures, 3) General Firm 
Characteristics, and 4) Foreign Experience. As with our cultural distance metrics, the actual 
cardinal values assigned to our Political Risk attributes are of relatively little import. That said, 
we note that the considerable variation exhibited by each of these metrics should allow us to 
more effectively control for the potential influence of these forces, and thereby provide a 
cleaner and more powerful test. 
Similarly, our business environment controls are generally most noteworthy in that they exhibit 
discernable variation. Highlighting a pair of these variables, we observe 72.7% of firm month 
observations come from firms headquartered in countries whose legal systems are based 
upon the foundational tenets of (British) Common Law, while 30.3% of sample observations 
are associated with accounting disclosures following Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) rather than International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).27 As firms are 
disproportionately more likely to be impacted by the prevailing legal and regulatory accounting 
environment of the jurisdiction in which they are headquartered, we choose to measure these 
attributes at the firm (rather than portfolio) level. Once again, these numbers are also 
consistent with previously reported findings within the literature along these dimensions. 
Turning to our firm specific metrics, the average firm in our sample is characterized by a 
market value of equity of almost US$3.5 billion. This number is slightly larger than that found 
for U.S. based firms, but is heavily skewed by a handful of very large observations. For 
example, Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited, a Hong Kong based (diversified) development firm, 
was valued at over US$52.6 billion in January of 2008. The median value along this dimension 
of approximately US$1.2 billion is nearly identical to that found in U.S. markets. Similarly, the 
market-to-book ratio for sample firms averages 1.158, while the average debt ratio is 40.8% 
(Debt/Equity = 0.689). These numbers are again very much in line with those reported by 
publicly traded real estate companies within the United States.28 Interestingly, the sample is 
relatively evenly split between firms with active development programs (58.4%) and those 
restricting their activities to the ownership and/or operation of existing structures. 
With respect to investment property holdings, the typical firm in our sample holds 50 distinct 
investment properties, though we once again observe wide variation along this dimension and, 
as previously mentioned, sample firms appear to be increasing their focus and investing in 
fewer properties through time. Additionally, we note that while the typical firm holds investment 
properties in 3 countries, approximately 20% of our sample firm-month observations come 
from firms holding investment assets across five or more countries, again highlighting the 
willingness of firms within this region to invest across international boundaries. Conversely, we 
observe that 45% of our sample observations represent firms limiting their investments to a 
single country, and 32% of the sample represents firms restricting their investments to their 
home country. That said, as noted above, these investment holdings appear to exhibit an 
increasing focus/concentration over time. 
Finally, our last set of controls are designed to capture the foreign experience of sample firms 
with respect to managing and mitigating risk. Along this dimension, we observe that the typical 
firm in our sample has held international investments for approximately eight years 
(96 months). Additionally, we find a non-trivial 5.2% of sample observations are from firms 
headquartered in countries other than where their equity shares are traded. While only 0.1% of 
sample observations involve firms entering a new market within any given month, this pattern 
represents 8% of firms in our sample when extended across the entire evaluation 
period/interval. Moreover, we note the typical firm has approximately 34% of their investment 
portfolio holdings in foreign countries, while 37% have accessed foreign markets to raise debt. 
In general, the values presented in Table 2 are broadly consistent with those reported by 
Cashman et al. (2016) and other studies of the modern Asia-Pacific real estate marketplace. 
Univariate Comparisons 
Table 4 presents the results of our univariate analysis. Each month, we split firms into high and 
low intrafirm distance groups based upon the median intrafirm geographic and cultural 
distance values. We then compare the mean weighted average cost of capital across these 
sub-samples. Consistent with expectations, we find the weighted average cost of capital is 
higher at firms with more culturally divergent portfolios. On the other hand, somewhat 
surprisingly we also find that firms with investments spread over a larger geographic area 
exhibit lower weighted average capital costs.29 While partially consistent with expectations, 
these univariate comparisons may well mask the true underlying nature of the relation between 
distance and transparency. In particular, multi-national firms may well be more informationally 
transparent in spite of, rather than because of, the scope and breadth of their operations. For 
example, the multinational companies within our sample are significantly larger than those 
firms constraining their investment holdings to a single country.30 Failure to control for 
confounding organizational characteristics, like firm size, may well lead to misleading 
conclusions. As such, we simply note these findings and proceed to the multivariate portion of 
our analysis. 
Table 4 Univariate comparisons of cost of capital acquisition 
  High distance Low distance   
Variable Obs. Mean Obs. Mean T-test of difference 
Geographic distance: 
 Physical distance 7288 0.0834 7209 0.0913 −0.0080*** 
Cultural distance: 
 Hofstede 4 Factor index 7292 0.0883 7205 0.0863 0.0020** 
 Hofstede 6 Factor index 7289 0.0883 7208 0.0864 0.0019** 
 GLOBE 4 Factor index 7288 0.092 7209 0.0826 0.0094*** 
 GLOBE 9 Factor index 7288 0.0914 7209 0.0832 0.0082*** 
This table presents univariate tests of differences in means for the Implied Cost of Capital of firms with 
headquarters locations that are geographically and/or culturally proximate versus distant from their 
investment property holdings. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively 
Multivariate Determinants of Capital Acquisition Costs 
Table 5 presents the results of our multivariate analysis into the relation between a firm’s 
intrafirm physical and cultural distance and its weighted average cost of capital. All 
specifications include the controls previously mentioned, as well as time, property type, firm, 
and exchange fixed effects.31 Additionally, each model includes the average (physical) 
distance between the firm’s headquarters and the properties held within its investment 
portfolio. Columns one through four sequentially iterate through each of our four intrafirm 
cultural distance indices: 1) Hofstede Four Factor, 2) Hofstede Six Factor, 3) GLOBE Four 
Factor, and 4) GLOBE Nine Factor. Positive coefficient estimates on either the physical or 
cultural distance indices across each of these models would be consistent with intrafirm 
distance increasing the informational opacity of the firm. 
Table 5 The effects of distance on the cost of capital acquisition 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Geographic distance 
 Physical distance 0.007*** 0.006** 0.005* 0.010*** 
  (2.90) (2.46) (1.95) (4.14) 
Cultural distance indices 
 Hofstede 4 Factor index 
0.019***       
(4.53)       
 Hofstede 6 Factor index 
  0.028***     
  (4.62)     
 GLOBE 4 Factor index 
    0.036***   
    (9.12)   
 GLOBE 9 Factor index 
      0.030*** 
      (5.89) 
Political risk metrics 
 Disclosure 
−0.074 −0.033 0.163** 0.066 
(−1.09) (−0.47) (2.09) (0.82) 
 ORI 
-0.118*** −0.112*** −0.113*** −0.095** 
(−3.08) (−2.91) (−2.95) (−2.47) 
 R-Factor 
0.148*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.128*** 
(3.95) (3.89) (4.00) (3.40) 
 PRI 
0.268*** 0.256*** 0.284*** 0.308*** 
(7.64) (7.22) (8.28) (9.06) 
Business environment measures 
 UK Law 
0.236*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 0.202*** 
(7.51) (6.74) (6.56) (6.17) 
 Bank dominated 
−0.226*** −0.228*** 0.060*** −0.350*** 
(−11.27) (−11.33) (3.53) (−15.06) 
 GAAP 
-0.003** −0.003* −0.003* −0.003* 
(−1.97) (−1.94) (−1.86) (−1.84) 
 Time to export 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(10.28) (10.28) (10.37) (9.82) 
 Property acquisition complexity −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
(−6.86) (−6.82) (−5.77) (−6.39) 
 Market cap/GDP 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(10.33) (10.42) (10.49) (10.70) 
 Broadband per 100 
−0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
(−8.84) (−8.88) (−9.74) (−8.88) 
 Education spending 
−0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** 
(−10.12) (−10.18) (−9.90) (−9.29) 
 Female labor force participation 
−0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
(−5.63) (−5.71) (−5.83) (−5.32) 
General firm characteristics 
 Ln(Mkt Cap) 
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(4.65) (4.67) (4.39) (4.44) 
 MtoB 
−0.006*** −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.005*** 
(−7.40) (−7.43) (−7.85) (−7.46) 
 Lagged leverage 
0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
(4.54) (4.55) (4.35) (4.57) 
 Asset tangibility 
−0.039*** −0.039*** −0.040*** −0.040*** 
(−4.85) (−4.90) (−5.04) (−4.94) 
 Log(Total assets) 
−0.048*** −0.048*** −0.048*** −0.048*** 
(−21.11) (−21.02) (−21.48) (−21.14) 
 Profitability 
0.066*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
(7.02) (6.99) (7.21) (7.19) 
 Secured debt 
−0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(−2.16) (−2.10) (−2.37) (−2.21) 
 Rated debt 
−0.177*** −0.174*** 0.149*** −0.150*** 
(−9.63) (−9.88) (14.98) (−6.63) 
 Split rating 
0.375*** 0.374*** −0.059*** 0.085*** 
(13.55) (13.73) (−5.07) (8.51) 
 Asset age 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 
(5.18) (5.04) (9.91) (10.33) 
 Repurchases 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.43) (0.45) (0.40) (0.46) 
 Operating leverage 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.66) (0.67) (0.68) (0.66) 
 Lease payments 
0.743** 0.750** 0.746** 0.733** 
(2.32) (2.35) (2.37) (2.29) 
 # of Countries −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.005*** −0.006*** 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
(−10.57) (−10.62) (−9.50) (−10.04) 
 Development 
0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.002 
(1.59) (1.59) (1.98) (1.60) 
 REIT Status 
0.004 0.002 0.081*** 0.057*** 
(0.54) (0.30) (8.50) (5.69) 
 # of Properties 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
(3.04) (3.33) (2.49) (2.86) 
 Single country 
0.006 0.007 0.010 0.009 
(0.60) (0.71) (1.03) (0.96) 
 Home indicator 
−0.018* −0.019* −0.023** −0.023** 
(−1.78) (−1.91) (−2.34) (−2.26) 
Foreign experience 
 Entrance 
0.022** 0.022** 0.020** 0.021** 
(2.17) (2.15) (2.02) (2.04) 
 Foreign tenure 
−0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** 
(−3.24) (−3.22) (−3.32) (−3.48) 
 Headquarter ≠ Exchange 
0.524*** 0.522*** 0.050*** 0.448*** 
(17.18) (17.37) (3.05) (15.82) 
 Foreign properties/Total properties 
0.029* 0.025 −0.011 −0.035* 
(1.86) (1.56) (−0.73) (−1.82) 
 Foreign debt indicator 
−0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** 
(−4.43) (−4.40) (−4.43) (−4.39) 
 Constant 
0.773*** 0.766*** 0.297*** 0.638*** 
(11.81) (11.65) (4.61) (8.12) 
 Year & month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Property type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Exchange fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 14,497 14,497 14,497 14,497 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.560 0.560 0.561 0.560 
This table examines the effects of distance on an Asia-Pacific real estate firm’s cost of capital. The 
dependent variable is the implied weighted average cost of capital acquisition. All standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered by firm and year-month. ***, **, and * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
Examining these results, we find strong evidence suggesting that as intrafirm physical and 
cultural distance increases, firms become more informationally opaque. Specifically, the 
average geographic distance between a firm’s headquarters and its investment properties is 
positive and significant related to a firm’s WACC across all four model specifications, 
suggesting firms which are more geographically disperse are characterized by reduced 
financial market transparency and a higher cost of capital. In terms of economic magnitude, a 
one standard deviation increase in the cross sectional average physical distance between a 
firm’s headquarters and its investment property locations is associated with, on average, a 13 
basis point (b.p.) increase in the firm’s weighted average cost of capital. Similarly, we find 
consistent evidence that greater intrafirm cultural distances, regardless of which of our four 
alternative indices are employed, are also associated with increased capital costs for sample 
firms. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation cross sectional increase in 
the relative cultural distance between a firm’s headquarters nation and its investment property 
locations is associated with, on average, a 67 b.p. increase in the firm’s weighted average cost 
of capital.32  
Turning to our control variables, a number of these attributes exhibit strong relations which are 
generally in line with ex-ante expectations and/or previous findings in the empirical literature. 
Highlighting a few of the more noteworthy results, consistent with emerging evidence offered 
by Cashman et al. (2016), political risk appears to play an important role within Asia-Pacific 
property markets, with three of our four risk proxies exhibiting high levels of statistical 
significance across all model specifications in Table 5.33 Similarly, consistent with previous real 
estate findings, but somewhat at odds with the broader finance literature, capital costs across 
this region appear to benefit from the reduced uncertainty associated with legal systems 
grounded on the foundational tenets of rules based civil law as opposed to UK based common 
law. As argued by Cashman et al. (2015), the contractual surety offered by civil law based 
legal systems may reduce the risk and uncertainty associated with exposure to unfamiliar (and 
unwritten) customs, practices, and precedents which govern common law. Continuing, we also 
find firms with more assets, and those with more tangible assets, exhibit lower costs of capital, 
as do firms with more secured debt and/or rated debt outstanding. Consistent with increased 
complexity leading to increased opacity, we also observe that firms entering new countries, 
and those whose shares are traded on an exchange in a country other than where they are 
headquartered, are both characterized by higher weighted average costs of capital. Moreover, 
we observe that firms with investment property holdings focused exclusively within their home 
country enjoy lower capital costs, while capital costs are directly related to the number of 
countries in which a firm holds investment property interests. Finally, we note that firms with 
more foreign investment experience have lower costs of capital. These latter results are again 
consistent with the notion that increasing cultural diversity increases information opacity, 
thereby raising a firm’s cost of capital acquisition. However, we also note that firms with foreign 
denominated debt outstanding evidence a lower cost of capital. While this appears somewhat 
in contrast to our core opacity results, it is potentially explained by: 1) firms raising debt 
internationally when it offers an opportunity to lower their cost of capital, and/or 2) firms 
matching the location and/or currency of their capital raising activities with that of their 
investing and revenue/income generation. 
Potentially, intrafirm physical distance will have a larger impact when the firm’s headquarters 
and properties are located in different countries than when they are located in the same 
country. For example, the physical distance between a firm headquartered in Singapore with 
investment properties in Malaysia may have a stronger impact on its cost of capital than the 
physical distance between a firm headquartered in Melbourne with properties in Perth, despite 
the latter having a larger intrafirm physical distance. In untabulated analyses we explore this 
possibility by interacting our home country indicator variable with intrafirm physical distance. In 
doing so, we find that intrafirm physical distance matters regardless of whether the firm invests 
in multiple countries or limits itself to a single country. More specifically, the larger the intrafirm 
physical distance, the higher the firm’s WACC. Moreover, this relation is actually magnified 
among firms investing only in their home country, potentially suggesting that while the costs 
and difficulties of managing disperse operations are still borne by the firm, far flung domestic 
operations do not engender the same level of geographic, interjurisdictional, or regulatory 
diversification benefits as cross-border investing. 
While WACC represents a firm’s overall financing costs, the interactions between the various 
intrafirm physical and cultural distance metrics and the costs of their individual financing 
components may also be informative. We explore these relations in Table 6. Consistent with 
our previously reported findings, the results presented in Panel A of Table 6 indicate that a 
firm’s cost of equity financing is directly related to cultural distance across all model 
specifications. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in a firm’s 
average cultural distance between its headquarters and investment property locations is 
associated with, on average, a 122 b.p. increase in equity capital costs. Interestingly, however, 
we observe that intrafirm physical distance is only significantly related to a firm’s cost of equity 
in one of the four model specifications examined. These results potentially suggest cultural 
distance may have a more direct impact on a firm’s cost of equity than intrafirm physical 
distance. Additionally, we note that risk premiums associated with the various stock exchange 
trading venues across the countries in which sample firm investment properties are located 
may influence a firm’s cost of capital. In untabulated analysis, we explore this possibility by 
replacing each firm’s political risk exposure proxies with a weighted average of the stock 
market risk premiums to which they are exposed.34 Comfortingly, we observe qualitatively 
similar results to those previously reported when we use these weighted average stock market 
risk premiums. Namely, both physical and cultural distance are significantly related to a firm’s 
cost of equity and WACC. 
Table 6 The effects of distance on the component costs of capital acquisition 
Panel A: Determinants of a-p real estate firm’s cost of equity (re) 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Geographic distance 
  Physical distance 
0.001 −0.001 −0.002 0.007* 
(0.32) (−0.16) (−0.61) (1.70) 
 Cultural distance indices 
  Hofstede 4 Factor index 
0.038***       
(5.79)       
  Hofstede 6 Factor index 
  0.056***     
  (6.09)     
  GLOBE 4 Factor index     0.058***   
    (9.27)   
  GLOBE 9 Factor index 
      0.058*** 
      (6.87) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,497 14,497 14,497 14,497 
Adjusted R-squared 0.604 0.604 0.605 0.604 
Panel B: Determinants of a-p real estate firm’s cost of debt (rd) 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Geographic distance 
  Physical distance 
0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 
(1.22) (1.80) (1.30) (1.26) 
 Cultural distance indices 
  Hofstede 4 Factor index 
−0.007***       
(−4.61)       
  Hofstede 6 Factor index 
  −0.014***     
  (−6.56)     
  GLOBE 4 Factor index 
    0.002   
    (1.21)   
  GLOBE 9 Factor index 
      −0.000 
      (−0.04) 
Year & month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,497 14,497 14,497 14,497 
Adjusted R-squared 0.606 0.607 0.606 0.605 
This table examines the effects of distance on a firm’s component costs of capital. Panel A reports the 
results regarding the firm’s cost of equity (re), while Panel B reports the results related to the firm’s cost 
of debt (rd). All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and are clustered by firm and year-
month. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
In Panel B, we examine a firm’s cost of debt financing. Exploring these results, we find little 
support for the notion that increasing intrafirm physical or cultural distance increases a firm’s 
cost of debt. While interesting, these results are not entirely unexpected. More specifically, 
both Cashman et al. (2015, 2016) report real estate firms investing internationally generally 
exhibit lower leverage.35 Their findings suggest that instead of raising the price of borrowing, 
lenders may ration the amount of capital extended to these firms. Consistent with the notion of 
potential capital rationing, in untabulated results we find that more geographically and/or 
culturally disperse firms do indeed exhibit lower leverage ratios.36  
We next ensure the robustness of our findings by splitting the sample between firms with 
active property development programs and/or pipelines versus firms focusing exclusively on 
the operation and/or management of existing facilities.37 We then examine whether the 
observed relation between a firm’s weighted average cost of capital and its intrafirm physical 
and cultural distance measures hold in these more focused sub-samples. Splitting the sample 
along this dimension is motivated by two key factors. First, the requisite skills necessary to 
understand the risk exposure and management capabilities of a firm may vary markedly with 
the nature of their holdings. To the extent assets in place, versus those under (various stages 
of) development, are more informationally transparent, both capital costs and the importance 
of intrafirm distance could vary meaningfully along this dimension. Second, we are unable to 
fully identify the scope, importance, and location of all currently on-going development projects 
undertaken by property developers. For example, many announced projects in the early 
planning stages will never actually be constructed, or may be sold to other organizations 
before completion. Similarly the geographic exposure of active property developers is likely 
more fluid and dynamic than that faced by owner-operators, as emerging market opportunities 
may lead these firms to quickly enter new markets (or leave existing ones) seeking to 
capitalize on previously unforeseen opportunities. These factors would serve to induce noise 
into our measure of intrafirm distance and geopolitical risk exposure, thereby making it harder 
for us to detect a significant relation. This bias should be most pronounced among firms with 
active development programs. The results of this robustness analysis are presented in Table 
7, and are once again broadly consistent with our previous empirical findings. Namely, intrafirm 
physical and cultural distance are positively related to a firm’s weighted average cost of capital. 
More specifically, the results presented in Panel A of Table 7 (development firm sub-sample) 
are consistent with on-going development properties mitigating our ability to detect precise 
relations. We find no evidence of a relation between a firm’s physical footprint and its WACC, 
though intrafirm cultural distance remains significantly positively related to WACC. In Panel B, 
the non-development sub-sample, we again find strong evidence supporting our hypothesized 
focal relation, as a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is once again significantly related to 
both its intrafirm physical and cultural distance. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
relation between cultural distance and a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is prevalent 
across both firm types, while physical distance is related to WACC for non-development firms. 
Table 7 Development versus non-development activities 
Panel A: 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Geographic distance 
  Physical distance 
0.001 −0.000 −0.001 0.002 
(0.21) (−0.04) (−0.42) (0.64) 
 Cultural distance indices 
  Hofstede 4 Factor index 
0.012***       
(2.72)       
  Hofstede 6 Factor index 
  0.024***     
  (3.33)     
  GLOBE 4 Factor index 
    0.019***   
    (3.88)   
  GLOBE 9 Factor index 
      0.047*** 
      (7.25) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8465 8465 8465 8465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.648 0.648 0.648 0.649 
Panel B: 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Geographic distance 
  Physical distance 
0.012*** 0.011** 0.006 0.020*** 
(2.65) (2.37) (1.36) (4.30) 
 Cultural distance indices 
  Hofstede 4 Factor index 
0.032***       
(4.39)       
  Hofstede 6 Factor index 
  0.044***     
  (4.56)     
  GLOBE 4 Factor index 
    0.067***   
    (8.32)   
  GLOBE 9 Factor index 
      0.057*** 
      (5.37) 
Year & month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6032 6032 6032 6032 
Adjusted R-squared 0.578 0.578 0.582 0.579 
This table examines the robustness of our focal relations by split the sample. Panel A reports the 
results regarding firm’s with an active development program, while Panel B reports the results for non-
development firms. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and are clustered by firm and 
year-month. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
In addition to ensuring our results hold across firm development activities, we also examine 
how the relation between a firm’s cost of capital and its intrafirm physical and cultural distance 
changes through time. As mentioned above, Adams et al. (2015) find risk spillovers across 
geographically proximate real estate firms are most pronounced during periods of economic 
stress and uncertainty. Consistent with this framework, both Kim (2009); Newell and Peng 
(2009) suggest the global financial crisis may well have materially influenced the performance, 
operations, and structural linkages of Asia-Pacific real estate markets both with, and in 
comparison to, their global counterparts. As such, we view year-end 2007 as representing a 
potentially important structural break point within our analysis. Ex-ante, we anticipate that both 
during, and immediately following this crisis period, market participants may well have become 
increasingly risk-averse and more wary of taking on informationally opaque risk exposures. To 
explore this possibility, we create a post financial crisis indicator variable, which we then 
interact with both our physical and cultural distance measures. Positive coefficient estimates 
on our interaction terms would be consistent with increased levels of risk aversion in the post-
crisis period. 
The results of this robustness analysis are presented in Table 8. Examining the results, we 
again find a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is related to both its intrafirm physical and 
cultural distance, and furthermore, the increase in a firm’s weighted average cost of capital 
associated with increased physical and/or cultural distance is more pronounced following the 
global financial crisis. Specifically, we find that the interaction terms between physical distance 
and our financial crisis indicator variable are significantly positive in two of our four model 
specifications. The average magnitude of these coefficients on the interaction terms 
corresponds to a 17.5% increase in risk sensitivity during the post-crisis period. Additionally, 
the interactions between our cultural distance measures and the financial crisis indicator are 
positive and significant across all four model specifications. These interaction term coefficients 
represent, on average, a 26% increase in risk sensitivity during the post-crisis era. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that physical and cultural distance may well play an 
increasingly important role in determining a firm’s cost of capital following the global financial 
crisis.38  
Table 8 Effects of the financial crisis 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Geographic distance 
 Physical distance 
0.005** 0.005** 0.004 0.010*** 
(2.08) (1.97) (1.64) (3.94) 
 Physical distance * Post financial crisis 
0.002*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001 
(3.02) (1.75) (0.76) (0.90) 
Cultural distance indices 
 Hofstede 4 Factor index 
0.016***       
(3.44)       
 Hofstede 4 Factor index * Post financial crisis 
0.004**       
(2.34)       
 Hofstede 6 Factor index 
  0.021***     
  (3.29)     
 Hofstede 6 Factor index * Post financial crisis 
  0.007***     
  (3.82)     
 GLOBE 4 Factor index 
    0.034***   
    (8.76)   
 GLOBE 4 Factor index * Post financial crisis 
    0.007***   
    (10.01)   
 GLOBE 9 Factor index       0.030*** 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
      (5.94) 
 GLOBE 9 Factor index * Post financial crisis 
      0.007*** 
      (10.17) 
 Post financial crisis 
0.028* 0.029* 0.006 −0.053*** 
(1.75) (1.81) (0.45) (−3.00) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,497 14,497 14,497 14,497 
Adjusted R-squared 0.561 0.561 0.566 0.564 
This table examines the effects of distance on an Asia-Pacific real estate firm’s cost of capital both 
before and after the global financial crisis of 2007. The dependent variable is the implied weighted 
average cost of capital acquisition. Post Financial Crisis is an indicator variable which assumes the 
value of one for all firm-month observations after 2007, and zero otherwise. While we again include all 
control variables previously employed in Table 5, for brevity their coefficient estimates are not reported. 
Appendix 3 provides a detailed description of each variable examined. All standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity, and are clustered by both firm and year-month. ***, **, and * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
Summary and Conclusions 
Throughout this paper, we examine the impact of intrafirm physical and cultural distance on the 
informational transparency of publicly traded firms. Specifically, using a sample of Asia-Pacific 
real estate companies, we explore how a firm’s decision to invest in geographically and 
culturally distant assets influences its implied cost of capital. Focusing our sample in this way 
offers several important advantages. Notably, given the tangible nature of the revenue 
generating assets held by real estate firms, as well as the scale and irreversible nature of 
many commercial real estate projects, the selection of this industry allows us to readily and 
accurately identify the geographic footprint of each sample firm. This identification is 
strengthened by the highly localized nature of commercial real estate space markets, which in 
turn is driven by the property type and location specificity (i.e., immovable nature) of the 
underlying assets. Furthermore, firms within this industry are typically characterized by 
relatively little investment in research and development activities, intellectual property rights, or 
other intangible assets, once again allowing for a relatively clean assessment of the firm’s 
underlying asset base. Potentially more important from a managerial perspective, firms across 
this industry also tend to exhibit high, often regulatory mandated, payout ratios. As a result, 
these firms face limitations on their ability to internally finance growth and expansion activities, 
thereby making them both frequent issuers in the capital markets and uniquely concerned with 
the potential impact of informational opacity on capital acquisition costs. Finally, from an 
estimation perspective, the selection of the Asia-Pacific region as the geographic setting for 
our analysis allows us to capture significant variation in our key focal parameters, as publicly 
traded real estate firms across this region evidence a unique proclivity toward cross-border 
investment activities. Taken together, these attributes allow us to more effectively isolate and 
measure the impacts of intrafirm geographic and cultural distance on firm transparency within 
this market sector. While we limit our analysis/sample to this single industry, we see no reason 
the relations observed here would not be generalizable to a broader cross-section of firms. 
Reviewing our focal results, we find strong evidence that Asia-Pacific real estate firms which 
invest in assets that are more distant, either geographically or culturally, are perceived as more 
informationally opaque by the marketplace. Specifically, these firms are characterized by 
significantly higher implied costs of capital. These results suggest that increasing the distance 
between a firm’s headquarters location and the revenue generating assets they own and/or 
operate effectively serves to create non-trivial information barriers which make the firm harder 
to value. Our geographic distance results are consistent with and extend the existing literature 
which documents “locals” possess an informational advantage compared to more distant 
investors, while our cultural distance results are also generally consistent with the growing 
literature documenting the importance of culture to the marketplace and the difficulties that 
arise when firms attempt to span multiple cultures. More specifically, using four alternative 
proxies for a firm’s intrafirm cultural distance, we find cross-border investment activities are 
easier to value when the investment property is located in a nation whose cultural 
underpinnings are similar to those of the nation in which the firm is headquartered. Robustness 
tests reveal these relations hold for subsamples of both development and non-development 
oriented firms, while additionally suggesting our findings are more pronounced during the post 
global financial crisis era. Together, these findings strongly suggest both intrafirm geographic 
and cultural distance represent value relevant components of a firm’s information environment, 
and as such, should be strategically managed to enhance shareholder utility. 
Footnotes 
1. For example, Jiang et al. (2014) find that firms with better corporate governance are 
viewed as being less ambiguous and exhibit lower bid-ask spreads. 
2. These influences include, but are not limited to, factors such as language, religion, 
gender roles, and a variety of additional customs and ideologies specific to a group of 
people. 
3. Examples include, but are not limited to: Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010); Anderson et al. 
(2011); Aggarwal et al. (2012); Baltzer et al. (2013); Beracha et al. (2014); Nahata et al. 
(2014). 
4. Noteworthy studies of these issues include, but are not limited to, Grubel (1968); Levy 
and Sarnat (1970); Stulz (1981a, b); Grauer and Hakansson (1987); French and 
Poterba (1991); Eichholtz (1996). 
5. Similarly, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find: 1) retail investors exhibit a proclivity 
toward overinvesting in local firms, and 2) retail investors earn superior returns on their 
investments in such local firms. 
6. Additional evidence on the information advantage of local investors within the 
commercial and investment banking arenas may be found in Degryse and Ongena 
(2005); Butler (2008); Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), while market microstructure based 
evidence on the informational advantage of local traders is offered by Hau (2001); 
Schultz (2003); Kedia and Zhou (2011) among others. 
7. An alternative explanation, suggested by Gaspar and Massa (2007), is that local 
investors are better positioned to monitor firms. Diamond (1984), among others, 
provides insight into agency issues associated with monitoring firm performance. 
8. North (1990) argues such social customs and conventions may well have a larger 
impact on daily interactions than more traditionally recognized measures of political risk 
such as a country’s foundational legal system. Similarly, Williamson (2000) 
demonstrates how cultural forces provide the underpinnings of the formal rules of 
economic activity. 
9. For examples see: Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010); Anderson et al. (2011). 
10. We note that an alternative means to examine these relations would be to examine the 
impact of distance on bid-ask spreads, analyst forecast dispersion/errors, the probability 
of split bond ratings, or various other proxies for increased informational opacity 
regarding the firm. We have explored the relations between bid-ask spreads and our 
distance measures, and once again find qualitatively similar results to those reported in 
the current paper. In sum, both increased physical and cultural distance are associated 
with wider (percentage) bid-ask spreads. Due to space constraints, as well as previous 
reviewer/discussant feedback suggesting the conceptual link between our focal distance 
relations is likely more important to company operations and insiders than market-wide 
investors, within the context of the current investigation we choose to focus our analysis 
exclusively on our cost of capital based results. 
11. While conventional wisdom posits that REITs and listed property trusts hold relatively 
recognizable and easy to value assets, we note this may not always be the case for 
individual firms. In particular, while the physical structures held by an organization are 
generally a matter of public record, individual tenant lease terms are generally not 
publicly disclosed. To the extent an individual property’s value is derived from property 
specific lease terms, we may well be understating the valuation complexities inherent 
within this industry. 
12. As a point of comparison, consider car manufacturer Toyota. While the bulk of Toyota’s 
Japanese operations are located in and around Toyota City, the profitability of the 
company is not critically dependent upon the economic vitality of the local economy, but 
rather upon the broader economic conditions over the (national, regional, or even 
international) range of markets where their products are ultimately distributed and sold. 
Commercial real estate markets, on the other hand, remain highly localized. As 
buildings are typically designed with a specific purpose in mind, and in addition are 
difficult if not impossible to move, both type and location specificity issues lead 
commercial real estate rents to be highly localized. As such, cash flows accruing to 
individual real estate investment properties are driven primarily by local economic 
conditions. 
13. While this coverage includes only a slight majority (127 / 211 = 60.2%) of the publicly 
traded REITs across the region as identified by European Public Real Estate 
Association (EPRA) (2013), these firms account for over 90% of the sector’s total 
market capitalization. Additionally, we note the sample includes (at a minimum) the five 
largest REITs headquartered in Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore. Precise 
property company and developer coverage rates are much harder to assess, but given 
the resulting size and characteristics of our sample firms, they again appear non-trivial. 
That said, our cost of capital estimates require multiple years of data to impute, thereby 
leading to the selection of a sample which is likely to be disproportionately weighted 
toward older, more established firms. To the extent these firms are more likely to 
evaluate the costs and opportunities associated with international investments, we view 
our results as a conservative estimate of the impact of intrafirm distance, and urge 
caution in generalizing these results to both newer and smaller firms.  
14. We determine a firm’s total debt by averaging the firm’s fiscal year-end total debt 
numbers across the current and immediately preceding years. 
15. For a detailed discussion of the development of the residual income valuation model, 
see Feltham and Ohlson (1995); Lee et al. (1999); Gebhardt et al. (2001). For examples 
of this model being applied to real estate markets, see Danielsen et al. (2014); 
Cashman et al. (2015). 
16. Ideally, a firm’s average geographic distance exposure would be weighted to reflect the 
relative values of each investment property holding. Unfortunately, our data do not 
include detailed, reliable, and timely information on individual property values, and thus, 
do not allow for this level of refinement. As such, our geographic distance metrics, as 
well as our cultural distance metrics outlined below, weight each investment property 
holding equally, regardless of their size, property type, or perceived value. 
17. Hofstede index values are unavailable for 10 countries in which sample firms hold a 
total of 46 investment property interests. Thus, index values are imputed for 0.47% of 
our sample properties. Excluding these properties from the analysis has no material 
effect on our conclusions. 
18. GLOBE dimension scores are unavailable for 15 countries in which sample firms hold a 
total of 72 investment property interests. Thus, dimension scores are imputed for 0.73% 
of our sample properties. Excluding these properties from the analysis has no material 
effect on our conclusions. 
19. As previously mentioned with respect to geographic distances, while we would like to 
calculate country weights based on market values, we are not able to obtain estimates 
of the market value of each firm’s investments in separate countries. Therefore, we are 
once again forced to calculate weights based upon the number of properties in each 
firm’s investment portfolio. 
20. For example, following Cashman et al. (2015) we control for the percentage of a firm’s 
investment properties that are located in countries with legal systems based on British 
Common Law. Additionally, to minimize the effect of outliers on our dataset, both the 
market-to-book and leverage ratios for sample firms are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Finally, a number of the firm characteristics reported by SNL are only provided 
annually or quarterly. Operationally, these variables are matched to the months covered 
by the report. We note that temporal aggregation does not appear to be driving our 
findings, as we observe qualitatively similar results if we perform our analyses annually 
(to match the most course data in our sample) rather than monthly. 
21. We readily cede the point that a plethora of alternative political risk proxies are 
potentially viable. As such, the selection of any specific risk metric is inherently 
somewhat arbitrary. The four measures we have selected have each been used in 
recent, peer-reviewed publications, and more importantly were selected as they exhibit 
relatively little correlation with one another. More specifically, the average Pearson 
correlation coefficient across these four alternative risk metrics averages less than 0.20 
in absolute value, with only the pairwise correlation between our Disclosure and 
Operations Risk Indices exhibiting a correlation coefficient greater than 0.22 in absolute 
value. 
22. It is also quite possible that firms headquartered and listed in separate countries have 
strategically done so to enhance their access to affordable capital sources within the 
marketplace. Thus, in the absence of appropriate additional controls, the observed 
relation could easily be reversed. Given our use of both country fixed effects and 
additional capital market controls, ex-ante we expected the increased complexity effects 
to dominate within the context of our empirical results. 
23. We have included 37 control variables that are categorized into four groups: political risk 
measures, business environment measures, firm characteristic measures, and foreign 
experience measures. A list, and detailed definitions, of these variables are provided in 
Appendix 3. 
24. We note that we receive qualitatively similar results when we winsorize the sample at 
1%–99%, or 5%–95%. 
25. Note, in recent years the firm has dramatically reduced the scope of its geographic 
exposure, currently holding assets exclusively in Australia and New Zealand. 
26. Additionally, we note that while a firm’s intrafirm physical and cultural distance 
measures are statistically significantly related to its political risk exposure, the 
correlations are relatively low. 
27. As Cashman et al. (2015) find evidence that firms located in nations with legal systems 
based on Common Law traditions have higher capital acquisition costs, we include an 
indicator variable identifying those firms subject to legal systems based upon the tenets 
of British (UK) common law. Similarly, to accounting for potential variation in the 
transparency of a firm’s financial disclosures, we control for the accounting convention 
(GAAP vs. IFRS) employed by sample firms. 
28. High regulatory mandated payout requirements for real estate firms electing REIT status 
serve to effectively drive MTB ratios toward 1.0 for firms within this industry. Examples 
of studies finding real estate company debt ratios in the 40–50% range include Feng et 
al. (2007); Boudry et al. (2010); Harrison et al. (2011); Cashman et al. (2016). 
29. In untabulated results we also explore the univariate relations for both the cost of equity 
and cost of debt separately. We find that our results are stronger when we examine the 
cost of equity, however our results with respect to the cost of debt are not consistent 
with our hypothesized relation. One potential explanation for these somewhat conflicting 
results is offered by Cashman et al. (2015) who suggest real estate lenders may 
account for prospective borrower risk through either the pricing mechanism or credit 
rationing. Alternatively stated, rather than charging a higher interest rate, lenders may 
simply reduce their willingness to lend. 
30. On average, multinational firms within our sample exhibit an average market 
capitalization of $4.6 million, while their single country counterparts exhibit an average 
market capitalization of only $2 million. 
31. Qualitatively similar results are obtained if we replace the exchange fixed effects with 
country fixed effects. 
32. Marginal effects based upon changes in Hofstede index values average 36 b.p., while 
marginal effects based upon GLOBE index values are substantively larger at an 
average of 98 b.p. Untabulated tests examining our intrafirm physical and cultural 
distance metrics in isolation provides qualitatively similar results. This suggests the 
unexpected Table 4 univariate results with respect to physical distance are likely the by-
product of complex relations with omitted firm characteristics, rather than a high degree 
of correlation between our physical and cultural distance metrics. 
33. Interestingly, however, we note our observed relation between a firm’s Operations Risk 
Index (ORI) and their implied cost of capital is negative, a result in direct contrast with 
ex-ante expectations. 
34. Stock market risk premiums are calculated in the same manner as our political risk 
metrics. Specifically, we calculate each firm’s property weighted average stock market 
risk premium. Similarly, consistent with Armstrong et al. (2011), in untabulated results 
sorting upon various dimensions of market competitiveness levels, we consistently find 
evidence that both intrafirm physical and cultural distance materially influence a firm’s 
capital acquisition costs. 
35. In untabulated analysis, we observe a similar pattern in our sample. 
36. An alternative explanation for the insignificant cost of debt distance relations is that 
firms may have greater access to foreign debt markets in which their investment 
properties are located. Distance may be irrelevant for firms borrowing money abroad, as 
the investment properties (and cash flows) securing these loans may well be ‘local’ from 
the perspective of these foreign lenders. In untabulated tests, we explore this possibility 
by limiting the sample exclusively to firms with foreign denominated debt outstanding. 
We observe qualitatively similar results within this more restrictive sub-sample. 
37. In untabulated tests we also bi-furcate the sample between high and low growth option 
(MtoB) firms, and also across REIT versus non-REIT organizations. Given the prevailing 
regulatory environments across the Asia-Pacific real estate landscape, the development 
versus non-development sample split is very similar to the REIT versus non-REIT 
bifurcation. In these additional tests, we continue to find support for our focal hypothesis 
that a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is related to both its intrafirm physical and 
cultural distance. 
38. In untabulated results, where we exclude observations occurring in both 2007 and 2008 
from the sample due to the large fluctuations associated with the global financial crisis, 
we find qualitatively similar results. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 9 Geographic location of properties held by sample firms 
Property country # of Properties % of Total properties 
Australia 1941 19.65% 
Belgiuma  5 0.05% 
Property country # of Properties % of Total properties 
Brazil 1 0.01% 
Burmab  4 0.04% 
Cambodiab  2 0.02% 
Canada 11 0.11% 
China 1503 15.22% 
Czech Republica  3 0.03% 
Fijib  5 0.05% 
France 55 0.56% 
Germany 45 0.46% 
Hong Kong 1161 11.76% 
Hungary 1 0.01% 
India 162 1.64% 
Indonesia 62 0.63% 
Ireland 1 0.01% 
Italy 1 0.01% 
Japan 2573 26.05% 
Macaub  9 0.09% 
Malaysia 126 1.28% 
Maldivesb  14 0.14% 
Mexico 2 0.02% 
Mongoliab  1 0.01% 
Morocco 1 0.01% 
Netherlands 4 0.04% 
New Zealand 82 0.83% 
Philippines 23 0.23% 
Poland 7 0.07% 
Russia 1 0.01% 
Seychellesb  3 0.03% 
Singapore 799 8.09% 
Slovakiaa  1 0.01% 
South Africa 1 0.01% 
South Korea 11 0.11% 
Spain 3 0.03% 
Sri Lankab  3 0.03% 
Sweden 1 0.01% 
Switzerland 1 0.01% 
Taiwan 5 0.05% 
Property country # of Properties % of Total properties 
Tanzaniaa  1 0.01% 
Thailand 46 0.47% 
Turkey 1 0.01% 
USA 922 9.34% 
United Arab Emiratesb  4 0.04% 
United Kingdom 231 2.34% 
Vanuatub  1 0.01% 
Vietnama  36 0.36% 
Total: 9876 100% 
aIndicates countries with missing Globe Scores. For countries with missing scores, we replace 
them with the cross sectional average of the corresponding index for the given month 
bIndicates countries with missing Hofstede and Globe Scores. For countries with missing 




Table 10 Sample firms by headquarters country 
Australia (23) 
 Abacus Property Group 
 Arena REIT 
 Aspen Group 
 Astro Japan Property Trust 
 Aveo Group Limited 
 BWP Trust 
 Carindale Property Trust 
 CFS Retail Property Trust 
 Charter Hall Group 
 Charter Hall Retail Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Cromwell Property Group 
 DEXUS Property Group 
 Federation Centres 
 Goodman Group 
 GPT Group 
 Growthpoint Properties Australia 
 Ingenia Communities Group 
 Investa Office Fund 
 Lend Lease Corporation Limited 
 Mirvac Group 
 Peet Limited 
 Stockland 
 Sunland Group Limited 
China (7) 
 Agile Property Holdings Limited 
 Evergrande Real Estate Group Limited 
 Guangzhou R&F Properties Company Limited 
 KWG Property Holding Limited 
 Modern Land (China) Co., Limited 
 Shui On Land Limited 
 SOHO China Limited 
Hong Kong (48) 
 Asia Standard International Group Limited 
 Century City International Holdings Limited 
 Champion Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Cheung Kong Holdings Limited 
 China Overseas Land & Investment Limited 
 China Resources Land Limited 
 Chinese Estates Holdings Limited 
 COFCO Land Holdings Limited 
 Country Garden Holdings Company Limited 
 Far East Consortium International Limited 
 Glorious Property Holdings Limited 
 Great Eagle Holdings Limited 
 Hang Lung Group Limited 
 Hang Lung Properties Limited 
 Harbour Centre Development Limited 
 Henderson Land Development Company Limited 
 HKR International Limited 
 Hon Kwok Land Investment Company, Limited 
 Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels, Limited 
 Hongkong Land Holdings Limited 
 Hopewell Holdings Limited 
 Hopson Development Holdings Limited 
 Hui Xian Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Hysan Development Company Limited 
 Kerry Properties Limited 
 Kowloon Development Company Limited 
 Lifestyle Properties Development Limited 
 Link Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Mandarin Oriental International Limited 
 MTR Corporation Limited 
 New World China Land Limited 
 New World Development Company Limited 
 Pacific Century Premium Developments Limited 
 Paliburg Holdings Limited 
 Prosperity Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Regal Hotels International Holdings Limited 
 Regal Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Shangri-La Asia Limited 
 Shenzhen Investment Limited 
 Shimao Property Holdings Limited 
 Sino Land Company Limited 
 SRE Group Limited 
 Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited 
 Sunlight Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Swire Pacific Limited 
 Swire Properties Limited 
 Wharf (Holdings) Limited 
 Yuexiu Real Estate Investment Trust 
India (8) 
 Asian Hotels (North) Limited 
 DB Realty Limited 
 Lancor Holdings Limited 
 Mahindra Lifespace Developers Limited 
 Oriental Hotels Limited 
 Parsvnath Developers Limited 
 Peninsula Land Limited 
 Royal Orchid Hotels Limited 
Japan (27) 
 Advance Residence Investment Corporation 
 AEON Mall Co., Ltd. 
 Daibiru Corporation 
 Fukuoka REIT Corporation 
 GLP J-REIT 
 Heiwa Real Estate Co., Ltd. 
 Heiwa Real Estate REIT, Inc. 
 Hulic Co., Ltd 
 Ichigo Real Estate Investment Corporation 
 Invincible Investment Corporation 
 Japan Excellent, Inc. 
 Japan Hotel REIT Investment Corporation 
 Japan Logistics Fund, Inc. 
 Japan Prime Realty Investment Corporation 
 Japan Rental Housing Investments Inc. 
 Japan Retail Fund Investment Corporation 
 Kenedix Residential Investment Corporation 
 MID REIT, Inc. 
 Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd. 
 Mitsui Fudosan Company Limited 
 Mori Hills REIT Investment Corporation 
 NTT Urban Development Corporation 
 ORIX JREIT Inc. 
 Premier Investment Corporation 
 Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd. 
 Tokyu REIT, Inc. 
 United Urban Investment Corporation 
Singapore (47) 
 AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT 
 Amara Holdings Limited 
 Ascendas Hospitality Trust 
 Ascendas India Trust 
 Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Ascott Residence Trust 
 Banyan Tree Holdings Limited 
 Cache Logistics Trust 
 Cambridge Industrial Trust 
 CapitaCommercial Trust 
 CapitaLand Limited 
 CapitaMall Trust 
 CapitaRetail China Trust 
 CDL Hospitality Trusts 
 City Developments Limited 
 Far East Hospitality Trust 
 First Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Forterra Trust 
 Fortune REIT 
 Frasers Centrepoint Trust 
 Frasers Commercial Trust 
 Global Logistic Properties Limited 
 GuocoLand Limited 
 GuocoLeisure Limited 
 Ho Bee Land Limited 
 Hotel Properties Limited 
 Keppel Land Limited 
 Keppel REIT 
 Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust 
 Mapletree Commercial Trust 
 Mapletree Industrial Trust 
 Mapletree Logistics Trust 
 OUE Hospitality Trust 
 OUE Limited 
 Parkway Life REIT 
 Religare Health Trust 
 Sabana Shari’ah Compliant Industrial REIT 
 Saizen Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Soilbuild Business Space REIT 
 Stamford Land Corporation Limited 
 Starhill Global Real Estate Investment Trust 
 Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust 
 United Industrial Corporation Limited 
 UOL Group Limited 
 Wheelock Properties (Singapore) Limited 
 Wing Tai Holdings Limited 





Table 11 Variable definitions 
Cost of Capital Metrics 
 Weighted 
average Cost of 
capital 
The firm’s weighted average cost of capital, where debt and equity 
weights are based upon each firm’s market leverage ratio. 
 Cost of debt The firm’s cost of debt, estimated as total interest expense divided by 
average total debt. 
 Cost of equity The firm’s cost of equity capital, estimated using the residual income 
model of valuation. 
Geographic and Cultural Distance Metrics 
 Physical distance The average geographic distance between each firm’s headquarters and 
its investment property locations, measured in thousands of miles. 
 Hofstede 4 Factor 
index 
The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using four 
of Hofstede’s culture dimensions: Power Distance, Individualism versus 
Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, and Uncertainty Avoidance. 
 Hofstede 6 Factor 
index 
The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using all of 
Hofstede’s six culture dimensions. 
 GLOBE 4 Factor 
index 
The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using four 
of Globe’s culture dimensions: Future Orientation, Assertiveness, In-
Group Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance. 
 GLOBE 9 Factor 
index 
The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using all 
nine of Globe’s culture dimensions. 
Political Risk Metrics 
 Disclosure The property weighted average of the Business Extent of Disclosure 
index, as reported by the World Bank. Higher values indicate investors 
are less protected, as firms are required to disclose less financial and 
ownership information. 
 ORI The property weighted average of the operations risk index, as reported 
by Business Risk Services. Higher values indicate more operational risk. 
 R-Factor The property weighted average of the Business Risk Service remittances 
and repatriation of capital factor. Higher values indicate it is relatively 
harder to repatriate profits. 
 PRI The property weighted average of the Political Risk Index, as reported by 
Business Risk Service. It is an assessment of a panel of 102 experts who 
pinpoint areas of pivotal political change, and provides ratings on 
sociopolitical conditions. Higher values indicate more sociopolitical risk. 
Business Environment Measures 
 UK Law The property weighted average of the percentage of a real estate 
company’s properties located in countries with a (United Kingdom) 
Common Law based legal system. 
 Bank dominated An indicator variable taking the value of one if the ratio of domestic 
assets of deposit money banks to total equity market capitalization is less 
than 1.10, zero otherwise. 
 GAAP An indicator variable which equals one if the firm uses GAAP accounting 
principles for its corporate financial disclosures, and zero otherwise. 
 Time to export The property weighted average of the minimum time it takes (in days) to 




The property weighted average of the minimum number of procedures 
required for a business to secure rights to a property, as reported by the 
World Bank. 
 Market cap / GDP The property weighted average of the ratio of the equity market 
capitalization of domestic firms to a country’s GDP, as reported by the 
World Bank. 
 Broadband per 
100 
The property weighted average of the number of broadband subscribers 
per 100 people, as reported by the World Bank. 
 Education 
spending 
The property weighted average of the percentage of GDP spent per 
student on primary school education, as reported by the World Bank. 
 Female labor 
Force Participation 
The property weighted average of the proportion of females who actively 
participate in the work force, as reported by the World Bank. 
General Firm Characteristics 
 Ln(Mkt Cap) Equals the log transformation of the firm’s total equity market 
capitalization (in millions of dollars) as reported by Bloomberg. 
 MtoB The market value to book value of equity ratio, as reported by 
Bloomberg. 
 Leverage The ratio of a firm’s total debt (short-term plus long-term debt) divided by 
its total common equity, as reported by Bloomberg. 
 Asset tangibility Total Real Estate Operations / Total Assets. 
 Total assets (in 
$1000s) 
The firm’s total assets measured in US dollars. 
 Profitability Funds from Operations (FFO) divided by Total Assets. 
 Secured debt Secured Debt divided by Total Debt. 
 Rated debt An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has rated debt 
outstanding, and zero otherwise. 
 Split rating An indicator variable set equal to one if two or more rating agencies have 
different notch level long-term issuer credit ratings for the firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
 Asset age Lengh of time (in years) since the first record of the firm’s total assets in 
SNL. 
 Repurchases An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm’s total shares 




The change in a firm’s funds from operations (∆FFO) divided by its 
change in total revenue (∆Revenue). To reduce the effect of extreme 
value observations along this dimension, sample observations are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 Lease payments The firm’s total committed capital lease obligations divided by its Total 
Assets. 
 # of Countries The total number of different countries in which the firm owns investment 
properties during a given month. 
 Development An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm engages in investment 
property development, construction programs, or has an active property 
development pipeline; zero otherwise 
 REIT status An indicator variable for whether a company has elected to be taxed as a 
real estate investment trust (REIT) for corporate income tax purposes. It 
equals one if the company has elected REIT status, and zero otherwise. 
 # of properties The total number of investment properties owned by a firm. 
 Single country An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is invested in only one 
country, and zero otherwise. 
 Home indicator An indicator variable set equal to one if a firm owns no foreign properties, 
and zero otherwise. 
Foreign Experience 
 Entrance An indicator variable for whether a firm buys a property in a given country 
for the first time. If the property acquisition date is missing, we replace it 
with the date for the first observation of that firm. It equals one if it is the 
first time to buy a property in a given country, and zero otherwise. 
 Foreign tenure The property weighted, average number of months for holding properties. 
If the property acquisition date is missing, we replace it with the date for 
the first observation of that firm. 
 Headquarter 
≠Exchange 
An indicator variable set equal to one if a firm’s exchange trading venue 




The ratio of a firm’s number of foreign properties owned to its total 
number of properties. 
 Foreign debt 
indicator 
An indicator variable set equal to one if a firm has outstanding debt 
denominated in the currency of a foreign country, and zero otherwise. 
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